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Traditional indicators of protection refer to the level effect of price policies on income 
and ignore the stabilizing effect.  We derive a measure of the real rate of protection which 
incorporates these dual dimensions.  The income stabilizing effects of price policy 
protection lead to a greater level of real protection than would be measured 
conventionally.  Computed real protection rates for the European Union wheat market 
over the pre- and post-MacSharry reform periods were found to be some 3-5 percent 
greater than traditional indicators.  Moreover, the compensatory payments to farmers 
following the 1992 reforms had a major risk reducing impact. 
 The Real Rate of Protection: The Stabilizing Effect of Price Policies and Direct Transfers 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Despite the efforts of the WTO to reduce trade barriers, the successful elimination of all 
barriers remains elusive.  There are many different reasons why countries protect their 
agricultural sectors from international competition.  Protectionist policies of individual 
developed countries are often entrenched in long histories of political and economic 
compromise.  The objectives are often multi-faceted and complex.  In general two basic 
types of policy support to agriculture are used: market-price supports and government 
subsidies.  Price policy supports often take the form of price interventions supported by 
trade barriers such as tariffs and quantitative restrictions (Valdez).  On the other hand, 
subsidies take the form of government financed surplus storage or removal, indirect input 
subsides or direct transfer payments to producers.  These policies are largely intended to 
support the level of producer incomes, however, unintended risk benefits may result.  In 




Traditional indicators of protection rates only refer to the level effect of price policies on 
income.  For instance, the nominal protection rate simply indicates the percentage by 
which the domestic price exceeds the border price, the effective protection rate 
incorporates a value added dimension, and PSEs attempt to account for all domestic 
policy transfers to produces.  These measures by themselves, however, ignore the price 
stabilizing effect.  In fact, agricultural price policies in developed countries aim at 
protecting farmers against both low world market prices and volatile world market prices.  
This kind of “double protection” can only be calculated on the basis of an expected utility 
approach, measuring the percentage increase of the expected utility of income or of the 
certainty equivalent of income, respectively.  Following Newbery and Stiglitz (1981), we 
use the mean-coefficient of variation approximation with log-normally distributed 
incomes to derive an expression for the real rate of protection (RRP).  Algebraically, the 
RRP is determined by the effective protection rate, the coefficient of variation of income 
and, the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
 
II.  Methodology 
 
We apply an expected utility approach that incorporates the first (mean) and second 
(variance) moments of the probability distribution of real income.  Assuming a log-
normal distribution of real income, The mean-coefficient of variation formula of expected 
utility of income is
1; 
 
                                                
1 Perhaps more familiar, if one alternatively assumes that real income is normally distributed, the simple 
mean-variance formula of expected utility of income is: E[U (y)] = E(y) – ½ A var(y) where y = income 
and , A = coefficient of absolute risk aversion.             
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  where, U = utility, y = income, cv = coefficient of variation of income and, 
  R = coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
 
If we define this double protection rate, or the real rate of protection, as the percentage 
change in the expected utility of income with protection  ) ˆ ( 0 yv i s  a vis without protection 
) ˆ ( 1 y , we can derive (see Appendix A): 
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      where, EPR = effective protection rate (percent change in income), 
1 y cv  = coefficient  
      of variation of income: i= 0 without protection and i = 1 with protection and, R =  
      coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
 
In order to compute the coefficient of variation of incomes with (y1) and without (y0) 
double protection two further steps are necessary. 
 
First, world market price fluctuations  ) ( pw cv  have to be transferred to domestic price 
fluctuations  ) ( pd cv .  This can be accomplished by use estimated price transmission 
elasticities, ￿ (see Appendix B) 
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Next, the price fluctuations have to be transferred into income fluctuations by considering 
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Twenty-four years of annual wheat data in the European Union were available to 
implement our theoretical model. World wheat prices, CIF Rotterdam ($US), were 
obtained from the Economic Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
Since price data for the entire EU were not available, prices received by German 
producers were used as a proxy and obtained from the CRONOS data bank of EUROSTAT
2. Currency exchange rates from the IMF were used to place world prices on 
a local (German Mark) currency basis. Both price series were deflated by the consumer 
price indices of their respective countries. Wheat production data were obtained from the 
Economic Research Service and the Foreign Agricultural Service of the USDA. Cost of 
production data was available from Stanton (1986), Bureau et al. (1992) and personal 
correspondence with Jean-Pierre Butault.  The data list provided in Appendix D. 
 
The Policy Environment 
 
We identify two fundamentally different policy regime periods of the European Union’s 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): the “old CAP” and the “new CAP”. These two 
periods define the “protection” and the “without protection” periods, respectively.  The 
CAP policy regime during the period 1976 to 1992 is characterized as the “old CAP”.  
The policy objective during this period was to support farm incomes at a high and stable 
level.  The general result was that EU prices were in excess of and more stable than world 
prices.  In order to keep internal market prices from falling below the administratively set 
intervention price (set well above world market levels), intervention agencies would buy 
wheat at the intervention price, store it and sell it on the world market at a loss or, more 
commonly, provide private exporters a subsidy (restitution) equal to the difference 
between the intervention price and the world price.   
 
The first major structural adjustment in European agricultural policy took place with the 
CAP (MacSharry) reform of 1992.  The changes were considered so significant to 
warrant the name the “new CAP”.  Although truly significant changes occurred, they 
were implemented within the existing CAP structure of variable levies, export restitutions 
and the like.  This structure continued to isolate European agriculture from the world 
economy.  Implemented in July 1993, the MacSharry reforms called for compensatory 
payments to farmers and a continued lowering of price supports to levels closer to 
expected world prices.  The three major components of this reform were: (1) a substantial 
cut in intervention prices (30 percent), phased in over a three-year period, (2) 
compensation to farmers for the price cuts through subsidies per hectare (area premiums), 
and (3) land “set-aside” requirements; preference was given to small farmers who were 
eligible to receive payments without the set-aside requirement.  Even thought the 
compensatory payments were not truly decoupled from cropped area, this was a major 
step toward a market-oriented grain economy.   
 
This “new CAP” period also includes the 1995 Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture (URAA).  The old system of threshold prices and variable levies was 
abolished under the process of tariffication; these and other non-tariff barriers were 
converted to conventional tariffs and reduced over time.  The first of the tariff cuts took 
place in July, 1995, and the new arrangements limited the import tax so that the landed 
price could not exceed 155 percent of the intervention price or the tariff equivalent, 
which ever was less. The tariff equivalent was to be reduced 36 percent over a six-year 
period.  Constraints on the total level of support provided by the CAP were also imposed.   
                                                
2 Germany is second only to France in volume of EU wheat production. Model Implementation 
 
In order to implement our measure of the Real Rate of Protection (RRP) we need to 
compute the individual components of equation (2).  First, we compute the traditional 
ERP measure as the percentage change in real producer incomes over the two periods: 
period 1 (1988-92) and period 2 (1993-98). Income is defined as a gross margin, price 
minus variable cost.  This simply represents the percent that profits during the highly 
protected pre-MacSharry period (76-92) exceeded those of the post-MacSharry period. 
Without compensatory payments, our ERP is estimated to be 2.37.  This indicates that 
average real farm income was 136 percent greater during the period 1988-92 than during 
the subsequent 1993-98 period.  In other words, the post-MacSharry period real farm 
incomes were only 37 percent of the pre-reform average.  However, when compensatory 
payments are added (variable Ct in appendix D), the estimated ERP is 0.36, meaning that 
pre-MacSharry incomes were 36 percent higher than the post-reform average.   
 
Second, we compute the coefficients of variation of world prices for the two periods. 
Equation (3) is used to transform these to domestic price coefficients of variation.  As 
shown earlier, the coefficient of variation of domestic price is simply the product of the 
price transmission elasticity and the coefficient of variation of world price.  Instead of 
computing the coefficient of variation of domestic prices directly, we estimate them 
under alternative assumptions of the price elasticity of transmission.  Tyers and Anderson 
(1992) refer to these elasticities as “price policy parameters” while Dutton and Grennes 
describe them as a summary measure of all government policies that separate foreign and 
domestic markets.  Thus, as a general measure of domestic market insulation from world 
markets, the transmission elasticity increases as markets are liberalized.  Drawing upon 
the empirical work of Thompson et al. (2000), we illustrate the sensitivity of RRP to 
transmission elasticities of 0.15, 0.25, 0.30.  Even with the MacSharry and subsequent 
Uruguay Round reforms, EU wheat price transmission elasticities greater than 0.30 for 
the EU have not been empirically found.  A transmission elasticity of 1.0 implies perfect 
transmission of world market price signals back to domestic markets. 
 
Third, we transfer the coefficients of variation of domestic prices into coefficients of 
variation of income. For each period, this computation is made according to equation (4).  
The coefficients of variation of real incomes are measured as trend-corrected coefficients 
of variation following the approach of Cuddy and Della Valle (1978).  Finally we need to 
assess the coefficient of relative risk aversion, R. Drawing upon the work of Saha, 
Shumway and Talpaz (1994), we posit three possible levels of increasing risk aversion, 
1.0, 2.0, and 3.0, respectively. 
 
The term in the square bracket of equation (2) adjusts the traditional effective rate of 
protection (ERP) by the relative volatility of income for a risk-averse producer. Three 
cases are identified.  First, this term is larger than 1.0 if the trend-adjusted coefficient of 
income with protection is lower than without protection. On the other hand, this term is 
smaller than 1.0 if the trend-adjusted coefficient of income with protection is greater than 
that without protection. And, this term is 1.0 if the trend-adjusted coefficient of income is 
unaffected by the level of protection.   
In the first case above, the value of RRP is larger than the traditional ERP. This means 
the real rate of protection (RRP) is evaluated as higher than the traditional evaluation 
because of the dampening effect on income volatility resulting from protection. In the 
second case, the value of RRP is smaller than ERP and in the third case we have the same 
evaluation. Again in the first case, the more risk averse the producer the greater the term 
in the square bracket. This is because the more risk averse the producer, the greater the 
benefit from decreased income volatility. The opposite is true in the second case. In 
general, the greater the level of relative risk aversion, the greater the real rate of 
protection.  
 
This adjustment for risk aversion is reasonable for a risk averse producer because his 
utility is higher as the volatility of income decreases. Although the traditional way of 
evaluating price support protection programs takes the expected value of income into 
consideration, it does not considered the volatility of income; a reasonable approach only 
if producers are risk neutral. 
 
In Table 1 estimates of the real rate of protection (RRP) for the EU wheat market are 
shown without compensatory payments. We examine the effects on RRP of increased 
price transmission elasticities and levels of relative risk aversion. Recall our estimate of 
ERP was 2.37. Thompson, Herrmann and Gohout (2000) found the price transmission 
elasticity during the pre-MacSharry period to be about 0.15.  
 
These authors further found that the MacSharry and subsequent Uruguay Round reforms 
increased the transmission of world price signals to domestic EU wheat markets such that 
the post-reform elasticity was near 0.30. In other words, the price transmission increased 
as policy reforms evolve. The relationships shown in Table 1 are consistent with 
expectations. In particular, the real rate of protection is positively related to both the price 
transmission elasticity and the degree of relative risk aversion. For all reported vales in 
Table 1, the real rate of protection exceeds the traditional measure. More concretely, 
because income volatility was found to be greater during the post-MacSharry period than 
before, a greater degree of wheat industry protection has actually occurred than 
traditional measures would have revealed. Thus, without accounting for the effect of 
price policy protection on producer income volatility, traditional measures of protection 
are misleading. In the case of the EU wheat market, the traditional ERP is smaller than 
the real rate of protection by some 3-5 percent (for R =2.0 and ￿ = 0.30).  Also as the 
degree of risk aversion increases from 1.0 to 3.0 (￿ = 0.30) the ERP is 4-5 percent small 
than RRP.   
 
Some interesting results are obtained when the compensatory payments are added to real 
incomes (Table 2).  The addition of these payments had the effect of reducing the 
importance of risk in the RRP calculation.  In this case, as R increases from 1.0 to 3.0 the 
ERP is less than 1 percent smaller than the RRP.  In this case, the direct payments 
substantially reduced the role of risk in the measurement of protection.  Even a small 
difference in protection measurement, however, can be economically important.  
 IV.  Conclusions 
 
Traditional indicators of protection refer to the level effect of price policies on income 
and ignore the stabilizing effect.  We derive a measure of the real rate of protection which 
incorporates these dual dimensions.  The income stabilizing effects of price policy 
protection reveal a greater level of real protection than would be measured 
conventionally.  Computed real protection rates for the European Union wheat market 
over the pre- and post-MacSharry reform periods were found to be some 3 to 5 percent 
greater than traditionally conceived.  The addition of direct (compensatory) payments to 
farmers narrowed the gap between the traditional and our risk-adjusted protection 
measure.  Direct payments had a major risk reducing impact. References 
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0.25  2.405  2.442  2.479 
0.30  2.422  2.477  2.532 
 
 
a The pre-MacSharry price transmission elasticity was 0.15. 
 
 
Table 2.  Estimated Real Rates of Protection With Compensatory Payments 1980-98. 
 


















0.25  0.369  0.372  0.376 
0.30  0.371  0.377  0.383 
 
 
a The pre-MacSharry price transmission elasticity was 0.15. Appendix A 
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Define protection (RRP) as the percentage change in the expected utility of income with 
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Now, let  
 
                 ,
] [

















+ =  
 
substituting into (A.5) gives,  
 
(A.6)    RRP = (1 + EPR) ￿ K - 1Appendix B 
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 Appendix C 
 
Step three was derived as follows: 
 
x v q p y C d ⋅ − ⋅ =        ) 1 . (  
 
where,    y = income (profit) 
               v = factor prices, and  
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 Appendix D: The Data List 
 
 













1976  19.07  3.10  52.98  732.75  656.00  0 
1977  15.47  3.25  50.28  704.44  482.27  0 
1978  16.44  3.72  61.16  684.67  451.60  0 
1979  16.13  3.62  58.39  657.06  468.41  0 
1980  17.00  3.96  67.32  633.58  451.55  0 
1981  16.93  3.74  63.32  609.50  506.89  0 
1982  17.33  4.07  70.53  598.37  462.53  0 
1983  17.62  4.03  71.01  584.91  471.06  0 
1984  17.75  5.12  90.88  543.75  493.02  0 
1985  16.78  4.70  78.87  480.68  460.40  0 
1986  17.27  4.63  79.96  470.38  289.30  0 
1987  17.41  4.52  78.69  448.56  222.27  0 
1988  16.90  4.80  81.12  407.09  260.11  0 
1989  17.70  4.80  84.96  382.50  287.61  0 
1990  17.30  5.10  88.23  353.74  200.87  0 
1991  17.50  5.30  92.75  336.80  185.85  0 
1992  17.40  5.00  87.00  320.13  208.00  0 
1993  15.70  5.30  83.21  279.51  227.80  3767 
1994  15.80  5.40  85.32  238.55  227.88  5176 
1995  16.20  5.30  85.86  218.97  206.90  6705 
1996  16.70  5.90  98.53  223.37  222.31  6806 
1997  17.10  5.50  94.05  201.92  179.44  6840 
1998  17.10  6.10  104.31  189.61  141.41  6778 
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